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Cady: Law of Products Liability in West Virginia

LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
IN WEST VIRGINIA
*THOMAS C. CADY
We are now all well-accustomed to rapid change. Alvin Toffler
writes in his book, aptly titled Future Shock, that the rate of
change in society today is accelerating and has become a major
challenge to the individual's capacity to adapt and cope. In striking
similarity, the change in products liability law has been so rapid that
it presents one of the most fascinating examples of the common
law's flexibility and its leadership role in social change. The purpose
of this article is to detect, hopefully, the current state of the law of
products liability in West Virginia and to make some suggestions
about the future course that may be followed.
The law of products liability in West Virginia is rich in its
variety of theories and its potential for development. The first
theory investigated is negligence. Several points emerge. West Virginia's negligence-based products liability law was quite conventional
in terms of the pre-MacPherson' law; yet remains unsettled even now
so many years after MacPherson; and there is a rather sharp
divergence of opinion between the federal courts (applying West
Virginia law) and the West Virginia court as to the status of
negligence-based products liability law in West Virginia. Some
projections for the future are offered. Part two surveys the past and
present state of warranty-based products liability law. A very short
part three suggests that the introduction of strict liability in tort
concepts into West Virginia's products liability law may await
legislative activity.
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Williams: Without "A Clear-Cut Definitive Ruling."
The old general rule of the common law dated from the famous
1842 decision in Winterbottom v. Wright' which held that a manufacturer or seller of a chattel was not liable to third parties, whether
for nonfeasance or for misfeasance. The articulated legal reasoning
was that there was no "privity" of contract between the manufacturer
or seller and the injured third party. Subsequently, the courts began
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
B. A. 1958, Rice University; L.L.B. 1965, University of Texas; L.L.M. 1967,
Georgetown University.
I MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2 r18421 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402.
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to engraft a series of exceptions into the general rule, the most important of which was that the seller was liable to an injured third
party where he was injured by an article "imminently" or "inherently"
dangerous to life or health. Included within this exception were such
obvious items as drugs, food and drink, firearms and explosives.
Such was the settled law until the famous 1916 MacPherson'
case. Cutting through the maze of exceptions and reversing the old
general rule, Judge Cardozo held that general rules of negligence
would govern the manufacturer's liability: the maker would be
liable in negligence for the foreseeable risks of harm without the
artificially protective bar of privity. The very careful Dean Prosser
on many occasions has asserted that MacPherson represents the
universal ("with the barely possible but highly unlikely exception
of Mississippi") law in the United States. Section 395 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts MacPherson as the prevailing
rule. The reporter's notes to that section also assert that MacPherson
"is now all but universally accepted in the United States." Contrary
to Dean Prosser and the Restatement, the acceptability of MacPherson in West Virginia is far from clear, and the source of confusion is
the West Virginia court's enigmatic decision in Williams v. Chrysler
Corp.4 Even though MacPherson was decided in 1916 and Williams
in 1964, strangely enough the West Virginia court has never been
presented with an opportunity to make "a clear-cut definitive
ruling"5 on whether MacPherson is to be accepted or not in West
Virginia. The Williams case (and just a few other decisions) is basic
to an understanding of negligence-based product liability law in
West Virginia.
B. Pre-Williams: The Winterbottom Rule With Exceptions
And Some Federal Projections
As mentioned earlier, the old common law's general rule was
Winterbottom with later engrafted exceptions. The most important
is the "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous exception. Conventionally stated, the seller of a chattel "owes to any person [without regard
to privity] who might be expected to use it a duty of reasonable care
in its manufacture if the chattel is 'inherently' or 'imminently' dan3 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
Shanklin v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F. Supp. 223, 231 (S.D. W.
Va. 1966).
5
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gerous."' This exception has been clearly adopted in West Virginia.
Items specifically included within this exception in West Virginia are
products especially prepared for human use or consumption,8 drugs
or medicines.9 Items apparently included within this exception in
West Virginia are explosives and other inherently dangerous chattels.1" Two West Virginia cases are worthy of special note.

In Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co.," an apparent first impression case in the state, the plaintiff brought a negligence-based
products liability action against the defendant drugstore company.
The plaintiff had been ill for three weeks and was being cared for at
the home of a Mrs. McGary. Needing some epsom salts as medicine
for plaintiff, either plaintiff or Mrs. McGary sent the McGary son to
defendant's store to make the purchase. Plaintiff alleged that, rather
than the desired salts, the defendant, negligently dispensed saltpetre
which plaintiff took and suffered severe and permanent injury. The
trial court instructed the jury that if it found the sale was in fact
made to McGary, then plaintiff could not recover and that a duty of
only due care was owed by the defendant seller of dangerous drugs.
The defendant had a verdict and judgment, and plaintiff appealed.
The West Virginia court found the instructions erroneous in two
particulars. First, the court held that the defendant as a seller of
dangerous drugs owed a duty not of due care but of high care.
Second, the court noted that the trial court's theory of negligencebased products liability law was that if the sale had been in fact
made to McGary, plaintiff could not recover. The trial court
reasoned that since there was no sale to plaintiff, there was no
contract and thus no relationship could be found on which to base
a duty owing to plaintiff-nonpurchaser. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals emphatically rejected this reasoning and theory of
6 Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 659, 137 S.E.2d 225, 228

(1964).
7

Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d

898 (1939); Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190

(1902); cf. Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225

(1964).
8Webb v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d

898 (1939) (chewing tobacco).
9Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1902)
(medicine).

1°Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964)
(dicta citing no cases). Despite the fact that the court cites no authority, the

conclusion is consistent with the well-settled common law. See W. PRossERToRTs, 660 (3d ed. 1964).

1"50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1902).
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negligence-based products liability law, and firmly established the
basic imminently dangerous exception in West Virginia.
The court began with general principles of negligence law,
finding that "[i]f harm may come reasonably and probably to anyone from another's action, there is duty on him so to act as to avoid
such injury"12 and that "a party may be sued by such persons for
negligence, incapacity or misfeasance in performing his contract with
another." 3 The court noted that the general common law rule is
especially apt in regard to dangerous things sold, and that considering
the frights and dangers lurking in drugs, poisons and medicines any
other rule would be disastrous. Significantly, the court then relied
upon Thomas v. Winchester'4 (the leading American case holding a
seller of a mislabeled drug liable in negligence to a nonpurchasing consumer) as establishing the imminently dangerous exception to the
Winterbottom rule. The court then concluded with its own formulation of the exception: "[A] third party, a stranger to the sale, can
only sue when the thing used, or the negligent act, is very dangerous
to human life and injury may reasonably be expected to happen to
others therefrom. '"
The question arises: how do we know what products are very
dangerous to human life? The court mentioned many examples
including mislabeled drugs, poisons, medicines, foul food, a defective gun, a defective scaffold, a badly repaired gas meter and a
badly constructed ladder as all being imminently dangerous and
thus very dangerous to human life. On the other hand, the court
went on to note a general class of products not to be considered
dangerous and hence not within the exception: "We cannot say
that every one injured from [a] defect in a railroad car, or carriage
or machinery can sue the maker or seller."'" At first blush this distinction between products considered to be dangerous and hence
within the exception and products considered to be nondangerous
and thus under the general rule appears to be mechanistic and without
121d. at 647, 41 S.E. at 191.
13

Id.

6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
1- Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 651-52, 41 S.E. 190,
193 (1902).
161d. at 651, 41 S.E. at 193. The court cited cases denying liability to
third parties involving defective threshing machines and an improperly maintained coach.
14
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reason. Is it not unrealistic to find a defective scaffold which may
threaten one or only a few workers and perhaps a few pedestrians
below inherently dangerous, and on the other hand, to find a
defective railroad car or carriage which may threaten many passengers and many more bystanders or other property not to be
inherently dangerous? Perhaps, but the court gave a strong indication that the listing is not mechanically fixed and arbitrary but
rather subject to a flexible test: "What is the test or criterion always
applicable? Hardly any. Each case involving this nice principle
[the distinction between things imminently dangerous and things
not so] must be largely its own arbiter.""' Furthermore, the Court
indicated that on two occasions the flexible test is to be realistically
applied. First, in placing improperly dispensed medicine within the
exception, the Court realistically looked to the purchasing habits of the
public: "We know that drugs and medicines are kept in homes, and
may, probably will, be used by other persons than the one buying.
Such is the probable, usual case."'" The court also justified placing a
defective railroad car, or carriage or machinery in the nondangerous
category on the grounds of basic economic fairness for that era by
asking 'ho would sell under such a rule?"' 9
In short, three significant points emerge from the Peters case.
First, it is the first impression case on negligence-based products
liability law in the state and hence is entitled to considerable
precedential value. Second, it firmly fixed into West Virginia's
negligence-based products liability law the inherently dangerous
exception to the Winterbottom-privity rule. Third, to determine which
products are considered to be or not to be inherently dangerous, the
case adopted a realistically based, extremely flexible test, which, of
course, under changing conditions would allow enormous expansion
and increasing inclusions.2
The other noteworthy case in West Virginia negligence-based
products liability law is Webb v. Brown & Willianson Tobacco Co.2

d.
181d. at 646-47, 41 S.E. at 191.
191d. at 651, 41 S.E. at 193.
2
oThis conclusion is hinted at by Judge Browning in Williams v. Chrysler
Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
21121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898 (1939).
1I
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In that case, plaintiff's son purchased from a retail store a flat plug
of chewing tobacco, known as Blood Hound, manufactured by defendant company. The plug contained a dead worm or moth from
which extended numerous fine stickers or stingers, hard and
penetrating in their nature, and each about one-eighth of an inch in
length. When plaintiff placed the chew in her mouth, these stingers,
in large number, penetrated the lining and tissues of the mouth,
causing great inconvenience and some pain.
Again, in a first impression case, the West Virginia court expanded the Peters rule in two respects: first, the Peters rule was
extended to include a nonfood product - tobacco, and second, the
Peters rule was extended from the retailer-seller to include the
manufacturer. The court quite explicitly rejected the narrow holdings
by several courts that tobacco is not a food and hence not within the
inherently dangerous exception to Winterbottom. The court held
that the
[M]ore recent cases, containing, as we think the better reasoning, hold that although chewing tobacco is not a food, it
is a product especially prepared for human use or consumption, and that lack of care in manufacturing the same
furnishes good cause for action on the part of a consumer
who may purchase the same from a retailer.2
The Webb case is also important because for the first time the
court approved the use of the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine in negligencebased products liability law. Subsequent decisions 3 indicate that
there is virtually no degree of proof of due care by the manufacturer
that will prevent the case from being submitted to the jury. For
example, in Blevins v. Raleigh Coco-Cola Bottling Works, 4 the
majority approved the application of res ipsa loquitur and held that
defendant's proof was insufficient to overcome the prima facie
presumption of negligence. The Court noted that the issue of
negligence was one for the jury despite the fact that defendant had
presented evidence showing that:
(a) it had the best type of machinery on the market;
(b) its operating methods were the same as those of recogat 118, 2 S.E.2d at 899.
Parr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Charleston, 121 W. Va. 314, 3
S.E.2d 499 (1939); Blevins v. Raleigh Coca-Cola Bottling Works 121 W. Va.
427, 3 S.E.2d 627 (1939).
24 121 W. Va. 427, 3 S.E.2d 627 (1939).
22"d.
23
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nized standard bottling companies; (c) it employed
"excellent help," and used every care possible in mass
production; and (d) a bottle could not go through its
soaking, brushing and bottling machines and "come out"
containing a substance [some kind of old rotten meat]
like that alleged by plaintiff."8
Two pre-Williams federal court decisions are all that remain
to complete the picture. In Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus
Co.' and General Motors Corp. v. Johnson' the third and fourth
circuits respectively, making Erie-educated guesses as to West
Virginia's negligence-based products liability law, held in cases involving negligently manufactured motor vehicles that the MacPherson
rule obtained in West Virginia. In fact the Carpini Court was most
assured:
Referring, then, to the law of West Virginia, it is clear that
we find there the adoption of the general rule concerning
the high duty owed by a carrier of passengers to its customers. Venable v. Gulf Taxi Line, 1928, 105 W. Va. 156,
141 S.E. 622. It is undisputed also, by the defendant,
General Motors, that the manufacturer of a chattel has
a duty of care to the ultimate consumer or user thereof.
This was declared to be the law of West Virginia by the
Fourth Circuit in General Motors Corp. v. Johnson, 4
Cir., 1943, 137 F.2d 320. To be cited also are Webb v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 1939, 121 W. Va. 115,
2 S.E.2d 898, and, as to Virginia law, Pierce v. Ford Motor
Co., 4 Cir., 1951, 190 F.2d 910. Indeed, this principle
has now become so well established that it would be sheer
affectation to pile up citation of decisions upon it. See in
general Restatement, Torts, § 388 et. seq.2"
This holding by the Third Circuit takes on added weight by virtue
of the fact that the unanimous opinion was written by the distinguished Judge Herbert F. Goodrich and joined in by the equally
distinguished Judges Harry E. Kalodner and William H. Hastie.
2S1d. at 430, 3 S.E.2d at 629 (dissenting opinion).
26216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
27 137 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1943).
21 Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404, 405 (3d Cir.
1954).
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Such then was the state of West Virginia's negligence-based
products liability law prior to Williams-the West Virginia Court
apparently applying the Winterbottom Rule with exceptions and the
federal courts and Prosser believing that it is beyond argument that
MacPhersonwas accepted in West Virginia. The stage is now set for
Williams.
C. Williams v Chrysler Corp.
Williams v. Chrysler Corp.29 decided by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in 1964, is the last word on West Virginia's negligence-based products liability law and the word must be
considered disturbing or even perhaps unsettling.
All the court held was that an express warranty (limiting
liability to the replacement of defective parts of an automobile and
a disclaimer of any other warranties expressed or implied and of
all other obligations on the part of automobile manufacturer) prohibited plaintiff, purchaser of an auto manufactured, and so warranted by defendant, from maintaining a negligence-based products
liability suit against the defendant manufacturer. Given this holding,
the court, quite naturally, felt that there was no need to decide the
MacPherson question. The court teasingly went on for five pages
discussing the MacPhersonrule and substantially unsettling the whole
thrust of negligence-based products liability law in West Virginia. In
the process of unsettling the law, the court, however, did make some
tantalizing suggestions which will be explored in part E infra of this
paper. As the court finally said in 1964, "We simply do not reach
that [MacPherson] question, and it is not decided.""0 And that
statement remains true today.
D. Post-Williams: Federal Guesswork.
The MacPherson riddle remaining after the Williams case has
not been answered by the West Virginia court. Judge Christie, however, in a 1966 decision, Shanklin v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,3 '
has provided an Erie-educated guess. In that case plaintiff, Shanklin,
was severely injured when his arm was caught in a forage harvester.
The harvester was manufactured by defendant, Allis-Chalmers;
wholesaled to one of defendant's authorized dealers, Greenbrier
Tractor Sales of Lewisburg, West Virginia; and subsequently retailed
148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
°Id. at 666, 137 S.E.2d at 226.
11 254 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
29

3

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss3/5

8

Cady: Law of Products Liability in West Virginia

LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN WEST VIRGINIA 291
to plaintiff's employer, Ralph Phillips, a Monroe County farmer.
Because of Phillips' other business interests, plaintiff Shanklin was
employed as Phillips' farm manager. While Shanklin was using the
harvester he attempted to clear a clogged roller. His arm was
caught in the rollers, crushed, and subsequently had to be amputated
about three inches below the shoulder.
Plaintiff brought a negligence-based products liability suit
against the manufacturer alleging among other things: negligent
design, demonstration, and instruction. Note that the injured plaintiff
was an ultimate user, not in privity of contract with an allegedly
negligent manufacturer-a prototypical MacPherson situation. Defendant vigorously contended that the harvester was not inherently
or imminently dangerous and thus, there being no privity of contract,
plaintiff could not maintain a negligence action against the manufacturer. Judge Christie noted that the West Virginia court had yet
to make a "clear-cut definitive ruling on the question of privity
requirement in the area of non-inherently or non-imminently dangerous instrumentality," and that there was a "spirited trend toward
disregarding privity." He then went on to conclude:
We find, however, that if this case, where negligence is the
gravamen of the complaint, were presented to that Court
upon the record now before us, it would adopt the modem
view by holding that such a showing [privity] is not
a requirement for maintenance of the action.2
Such was Judge Christie's projection. It now becomes our obligation
to determine from a close reading of Williams whether or not the
West Virginia court will confirm Judge Christie's prediction.
E. Beyond Williams & Shanklin: Personal Guesswork
Since Judge Christie in Shanklin felt that the West Virginia
court would adopt the MacPhersonrule should the issue be squarely
presented, it may be profitable to make some projections based on
a bit-by-bit, piece-by-piece analysis of the three hints contained in
Williams: (1) MacPherson by extending exceptions to Winterbottom; (2) MacPherson by limiting Winterbottom to contractors; and
(3) No MacPhersonbecause of constitutional restraint.

.2

Id., at 231.
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(1) MacPherson by extending exceptions to Winterbottom.
One of the tantalizing hints dropped in Williams is that the court
noted that the most general of all the exceptions to the Winterbottom-privity rule is the inherently or imminently dangerous
category. The court stated:
Perhaps all that the New York Court did in the MacPherson case was to extend the exception to the rule by
finding that an automobile would fall into the category
of being a dangerous instrumentality when it can be said
that it will be used by persons other than the initial
purchaser and used without
tests being made by the owner
33
to reveal latent defects.
The court was almost right. Ostensibly, all that Cardozo did in
MacPhersonis well summarized by Prosser:
"On its face the decision purported merely to extend the class of
inherently dangerous articles to include anything which would be
dangerous if negligently made."34
Thus, it would appear under the very flexible test first adopted in
Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co. ("What is the test or criterion
always applicable? Hardly any. Each case involving this nice
principle must largely be its own arbiter.")," that the West Virginia
court is now willing to define at least a negligently produced automobile as an inherently dangerous article. The "at least" part of
the statement seems all too clear in view of current carnage on our
highways.
Is the West Virginia court ready to accept MacPherson at full
value, i.e., to say that anything is to be considered dangerous if
negligently made? It may be for the following reason. MacPherson
is the universal American rule. With the weight of authority so
massively uniform, the court would set itself not against the trend but
against the well-settled, eminently sensible rule. The Winterbottomprivity rule no longer makes any sense and no one has had a good
word for it or its policy base in years. Borrowing some lines from
Judge Brannon's opinion in Peters and substituting automobiles for
his references to drugs and medicines, seems to settle the issue:
33

Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 659, 137 S.E.2d 225,

228 (1964).
3

4 W. PROSSER, TORTS, 660 (3d Ed. 1964).
35 50 W. Va. 644, 651-52, 41 S.E. 190, 193 (1902).
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We know that... [automobiles] ... are kept... and may,
probably will, be used by other persons than the one
buying. Such is the probable, usual case. Is it possible that
there is no reparation to this third person for irreparable
harm to him from such incompetency or negligence? Considering the frightful dangers lurking in . . . [automobiles] ... this would be a disastrous rule. 6
(2)

MacPherson by limiting Winterbottom to contractors.
Another teasing hint dropped by the Williams court was: "It
is interesting to note that the Wright case, establishing the privity
rule, involved the liability of a contractor and not of a manu7
facturer or seller."'
Prior to this statement, the court cited Roush v. Johnson 8 for the
proposition that West Virginia has accepted the inherently or imminently dangerous exception to the general common law rule of an
independent contractor's immunity for "turned-over" work. The
implication is obvious: The Winterbottom-privity rule will be strictly
construed; it will be applied to contractor's only, and then subject to
the inherently or imminently dangerous exception; it will not be
extended to manufacturers or sellers; and, thus, finally the ordinary
rules of negligence as per MacPherson will be applied to all other
providers of goods including manufacturers and sellers.
Since so few products are produced under special contract, but
are rather randomly produced for a pre-existing mass market, the
West Virginia court could without apparent "change" in the law
relegate the Winterbottom-privity rule to a very, very narrow corner
of negligence-based products liability law.
(3)

No MacPherson because of constitutional restraint.
The final problem involved in the adoption of the MacPherson
rule by the West Virginia court is mentioned in Williams. The West
Virginia Constitution provides in pertinent part that: "Such parts of
the common law, and of the laws of this State as are in force when
this article goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto, shall
be and continue the law of the State until altered or repealed by the
legislature."39

1d. at 644, 646-47, 41 S.E. 190, 191.
37 Wriiams v. Chrysler Corp. 148 W. Va. 655, 661, 137 S.E.2d 225, 229
(1964).
38
139 W. Va. 607, 80 S.E.2d 857 (1954).
39
W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 21 (emphasis supplied); See Note, The
Common Law as a Bar to Judicial Legislation. 71 W. Va. L. Rev. 341 (1969).
36
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Since this section speaks in terms of "when this article goes into
operation" which was October 12, 1880, one might think that that
is the base line date. While the point apparently has never been
explicitly decided, the court appears to use 1872 as the base date."
This application seems proper since the provision was substantially
carried over from article VIII, Section 36 of the 1872 Constitution.
Assuming then that 1872 is the right date, the question presented
is: What was the state of the common law in 1872?
It is quite clear that the English common law in existence in
1872 was the Winterbottom-privity rule with, among others, the
inherently or imminently dangerous exception." Although there is
some small room for argument based upon old West Virginia
precedents that the reasons for the Winterbottom-privity rule have
ceased to exist and hence the rule itself should cease to exist 4 2 or
that the old common law rule is repugnant to contemporary public
policy, 4' the more likely result will be as in Cunningham v. County
Court of Wood County,44 where the West Virginia court announced
that "[t]his Court, therefore, is sternly and unmistakably enjoined
to leave drastic changes in the common law to the legislative branch
45
of state government."
Thus, it may be that because of constitutional prohibition, explicit
adoption of the MacPhersonrule must await legislative action.

II. WARRANTY
A warranty-based products liability action is the second branch
of products liability law in West Virginia. Suit for breach of warranty has been called a "freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of
tort and contract. 4 6 Originally an action sounding in tort, it
40

Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital, 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965).
Another interpretation might be that the base date is 1863, since the provision
appeared first in article XI, section 8 of the 1863 Constitution. See Williams
v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964); W. VA. CODE ch.
2, art. 1, §1 (Michie 1966).
41 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852) is the
leading American case establishing the exception to the Winterbottom-privity
rule where the article sold is "inherently dangerous to life or health. It is
cited with approval by the West Virginia court in Peters v. Johnson, Jackson
& Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1902).
42 Currence v. Ralphsnyder, 108 W. Va. 194, 151 S.E. 700 (1929).
43 Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871).
44 148 W. Va. 303, 134 S.E.2d 725 (1964).
45 Id. at 308, 134 S.E.2d at 728.
46
W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATSRUAS ON ToRTS, 692 (5th
ed. 1971).
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gradually came to be regarded as a contract action and today contains elements of both tort and contract law. This section of the
paper will deal briefly with the old common law, and then express
warranty and implied warranty.
A. The Old Common Law
The basic general rule of sales and hence warranties was
caveat emptor-let the buyer beware.47 This is well illustrated by
the picturesque old -17th century case of Candelor v. Lopus.4 8 A
goldsmith sold a stone to the plaintiff stating that it was a bezoar
stone (a calcareous concretion in the stomach of a goat) believed
to have medicinal powers. The stone turned out to be worthless and
yet the court held that there could be no recovery even though
the seller knew his statement to be false. There was no liability since
there was no express undertaking to be bound. The court thus gave
legal imprimatur to the low business ethics of an era in which all
sellers were assumed to lie. It is against this common law background that we begin our investigation of warranty-based products
liability law in West Virginia.
B. Express Warranty
An express warranty theory based upon specific representations
by a seller concerning his product is one method of extending
strict liability to the consumer. While originally the courts limited
recovery only to cases of intentional misrepresentation in an action
for deceit, 49 the key modem American authority is Baxter v Ford
Motor Co.5" In that case the manufacturer was held strictly liable,
without scienter or negligence, to the plaintiff who purchased an automobile from a dealer on the basis of literature distributed by the
manufacturer representing that the auto's windshield was shatterproof.
Plaintiff was severely injured when a pebble struck the glass and
shattered it. The court upon first appeal adopted a theory of
express warranty but on second appeal the court based its opinion
upon a strict liability theory in the nature of deceit for innocent misrepresentation. This distinction will prove to be important below.
47

Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610
40 Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603).
49
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 69 YALP L. J. 1099, 1135 (1960).
50 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, affd per curiam on rehearing, 15 P.2d
1118 (1932), affd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).,
(1936).
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Thirteen jurisdictions have followed Baxter, extending it to
representations made in labels, literature or in advertising. Two early
federal cases rejected Baxter but are now without authority because
of changes in the underlying state law.' No other courts have
rejected the holding of Baxter. Although the law in West Virginia
is far from clear, Horton v. Tyree52 apparently is in accord with the
strict liability theory developed in Baxter II.
In Horton, plaintiff was induced to purchase shares in a coal
mining company relying upon representations that the shares were
"a good buy." The defendant contended that he should be liable only
for intentionally or recklessly false misrepresentations. The West Virginia court rejected this limitation and held that where
one who represents that a certain condition exists with the
expectation that another will act thereon, when in fact he
has no knowledge and regard thereto, will be as liable to
another who deals with him on the basis of such representation, should it turn out to be false, as though he knew of
the falsity thereof at the time it was made. "He is under
a duty to know," said the court, "that the things he represents as facts are in fact true at the time he makes the
representation. It is no excuse for him to say that he did
not know they were false, .... "
While Horton concerned recovery of property loss and a contract
measure of recovery, the language is broad enough for potential
expansion into the products liability field for personal injury.
C. Implied Warranty
Because of the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code by
the Legislature in 1963, effective since July 1, 1964, substantial
changes may be in the offing for implied warranty based products
liability law in West Virginia. Decisions are too few at present to
make an accurate forecast; but, the common law of implied warranty
prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., however, is fairly clear, strongly
conservative and, thus, may have an impact on future decisionmaking.
51 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 835 (1966).
52 104 W. Va. 238, 139 S.E. 737 (1927).
53 Id. at 243, 139 S.E. at 738.
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1. Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market

In Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market54 the West Virginia court,
in a case of first impression, noted that the general common law
rule of sales was that of caveat emptor but adopted the well-recognized special food implied warranty exception: "[W]here food is
purchased from a retail dealer for immediate consumption, there is
generally an implied warranty that the article sold is fit for human
consumption.""5 Notice the narrow framing of the rule of the case;
(a) the product must be food; and (b) the purchase must be from a
retail dealer. The court also went on to limit the rule further by
stating that the "food sellers implied warranty does not inure to the
benefit of parties other than the purchaser."56 Thus, the court
recognized the special food warranty but limited it to persons in
privity with the seller.
Finally, citing Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., the court
further limited the exception to unsealed foods:
[T]here is no warranty of fitness by a retailer who purchases goods of a reputable brand from a jobber or manufacturer in sealed packages or containers and sells them in
the same condition that they were in when purchased,
and without the opportunity of inspecting or of otherwise
determining the condition of the contents of the packages.
There might, however, be a question of negligence in cases
where the outside condition of the package or other
circumstances would be such as to convey information
concerning the contents or to put the retailer on inquiry. 7
Furthermore, in the Burgess case the court distinguished three prior
decisions.5 " In those cases the courts had held that the consumer
could maintain a negligence-based products liability action against
the manufacturer or bottler but only when the article was intended
for human consumption. The anomaly of basing liability of a
manufacturer or packer on negligence while basing the liability of
54 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785, 6 S.E.2d 254 (1939)
(concurring
opinion).
55
5 Id. at 609, 5 S.E.2d at 787.
6 Id. at 611, 5 S.E.2d at 787.
57 117 W. Va. 680, 682, 186 S.E. 610, 610-11 (1936).
58 Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d
898 (1939); Blevins v. Raleigh Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 121 W. Va. 427,
3 S.E.2d 627 (1939); Parr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Charleston, 121
W. Va. 314, 3 S.E.2d 499 (1939).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1972

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 74

a retailer on implied warranty (depending upon whether the food
sold by the retailer is sealed or not) was thus created. Judge Kenna
concurring in Burgess criticized this foolish distinction but it was
never cured by the court. No such problem should exist under the
U.C.C. since it implies a warranty without regard to the type of
seller. 9
While the court in later cases did expand the common law
of implied warranties to include products other than food, the
privity requirement limited protection only to the immediate
purchaser.6" The problem of the scope of the protection established
by even a U.C.C. implied warranty remains unsettled in two
particulars-persons to be protected and total nonprotection via
disclaimer.
2. Persons Protected
As previously mentioned the only person protected under the
common law implied warranty was the purchaser, even in the food
cases. Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. extends the protection to include
the purchaser, of course, but also the buyer's family, household and
guests. The official comments make it clear that the intent of the
section was at least to loosen the common law privity rules preventing
all but purchaser recovery. Moreover, the comments state that
"[tjhe section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."" '
The question then becomes: what projections can be made as to
whether the West Virginia court will enlarge the scope of persons
protected under an implied warranty? The answer is far from clear.
There are no West Virginia cases directly on point; but there are two
cases which give some indication.
2. (a) Nettles v. Imperial Distributors,Inc.
In a 1968 case applying the pre-U.C.C. common law of warranties, the West Virginia court noted that "we consider it reasonable
to state that the adoption of that Code by the legislature of this state,
and by legislatures of a great majority of the other states of the
59
60

W. VA. CODB ch. 46, art. 2, § 314 (Michie 1966).
E.g., Nettles v. Imperial Distributors, Inc., 152 W. Va. 9, 159 S.E.2d
206 (1968).
61 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 318, Comment 3 (Michie 1966).
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nation, demonstrates that anciently conceived principles relating to
implied warranties should be reasonably extended ...
""
This is not much, to be sure, but an indication that the court would
be favorably disposed to follow a trend or to join a majority on the
issue of the number of persons protected by a U.C.C. implied warranty. Section 2-318 has been held by the greater number of cases
not to prevent expansion to persons outside the distributive chain.
Only the Pennsylvania court has refused expansion.63 The leading
case allowing extension is Elmore v. American Motors Corp.6"
65
while the leading contra authority is Mull v. Ford Motor Co.
2. (b) Debbis v. Hertz Corp.
In Debbis v. Hertz Corp.66 the federal district court for Maryland citing two West Virginia Law Review articles 67 noted that a
significant argument can be made against extending the protection
of an implied warranty beyond those persons listed in section 2-318
of the West Virginia's U.C.C.
The West Virginia common law of implied warranties apparently
limited protection to the purchaser.68 In adopting the U.C.C. for
West Virginia, the Legislature, of course, was presumed to be
cognizant of the common law and was thus free to choose among
the various alternatives of section 2-318.69 The West Virginia
legislature, however, adopted the alternative which has been
labeled "neutral."' ° On the other hand, the Virginia legislature
adopted a consumer-prone alternative by enacting its famous antiprivity statute which expressly eliminates lack of privity as a defense
and extends the warranty protection to a "person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume or
be affected by the goods."7 The conclusion inevitably follows, that
62
Nettles v. Imperial Distributors, Inc., 152 W. Va. 9, 21-22, 159 S.E.2d
206, 214 (1968).
63 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MnN. L. REv. 791, 799 (1966).
64 70 Cal. 2d 820, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
6s 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966) (New York law).
66 269 F. Supp. 671 (D. Md. 1967).
67
Lorensen, Product Liability And Disclaimers in West Virginia, 67 W.
VA. L. REv. 291 (1965); Comment, 65 W. VA. L. Rrv. 326 (1963).
68 Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785, 6 S.E.
2d 254
69 (1939) (dictum).
UNFORM COMMERCIL CODE § 2-318 (1966).
70
Lorensen, supra note 67, at 299.
71 2 VA. CODE §8.2-318 (1965); Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privily"
Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51
VA. L. REv. 804 (1965); Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privily Requirement In Products Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982 (1962).
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given the old common law of warranties and the glaring contrasts in
attitudes between the jurisdictions "it seems doubtful that they [the
West Virginia court] will expand upon the action of the legislature
and further extend the protection of the Commercial Code.""2
3. Total nonprotection via disclaimer.
The second major problem under a West Virginia U.C.C.
implied warranty is that of disclaimer of liability. The common law
of implied warranties by virtue of Payne 3 and Williams 4 seemed
to countenance "disclaiming anything but liability for criminal conduct by anyone not a common carrier." 5 While both opinions were
decided before the effective date of the U.C.C. in West Virginia,
the court spoke fondly of better days ahead for the consumer under
the U.C.C., suggesting that the pro-consumer attitude of the U.C.C.
would have provided a public policy base for a differing conclusion.
That prophesy by the court has been severely criticized. 6 The West
Virginia U.C.C., section 2-316,"' specifically permits the seller to
disclaim any implied warranty liability. On the other hand, section
2-7198 declares that the limitation of "consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable." The issue for the future is whether the West
Virginia court will fulfill its prophesies of a new day of consumerism
a la Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,79 in West Virginia.
IH

STRICT LIABILITY

It should be clear by now that a warranty-based products liability
action is at most an unsatisfactory basis for extending strict liability
protection to those persons who may be injured by defective products. Problems include the limited scope of persons protected,80
disclaimers,' and the notice requirement.82 In response to these
Comment, supra note 67 at 329.
Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622
(1962)
74 (seller's disclaimer of implied warranty liability).
Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964)
(manufacturer's disclaimer of negligent liability).
7- Lorensen, Product Liability And Disclaimers in West Virginia, 67 W.
VA. L.
7 Rnv. 291, 294 (1965).
6 Lorensen, supra note 67.
77 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 316 (Michie 1966).
78
W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 719 (Michie 1966).
79 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (disclaimer and limitation of liability,8 not an implied warranty, unconscionable).
°W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 318 (Michie 1966).
81 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 316 (Michie 1966).
82
W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2 § 607 (Michie 1966).
72
7-
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and other problems 3 the A.L.I. proposed section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Because of the rapidly developing
case law the section was revised three times: first, to include only
food and drink; second, a broader coverage to include products
intended for intimate bodily use; and, finally, its present (1965)
broad coverage of all products:"
§402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer.
(1.) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product, and,
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2.)

The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
Plaintiff's burden is to prove (1) that there was a defect, (2)
which existed at the time the product left the hands of the manufacturer, (3) which was not contemplated by the user, (4) which
renders the product unreasonably dangerous and (5) that such
defect was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.85
There are absolutely no cases in West Virginia which approach
section 402A. Indeed, strict liability was denied even in the food
cases.6 Again, even in food cases brought against a manufacturer
83W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 707 (5th ed.

1971.8 4

RPESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
85 Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729, 736 (Wash. 1969).
8
6 Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785, 6
S.E.2d 254 (1939) (concurring opinion).
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or bottler, the West Virginia court required proof of negligence.'
This is not the rich rootstock from which will flower judicial adoption
of section 402A. It appears rather clear that the court is not likely
to extend the law of products liability beyond the limits set by the
Legislature.

87
Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 142 W. Va. 681,
97 S.E.2d 803 (1957); Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W.
Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898 (1939); See also Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W.
Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
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